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Beginning in the last decade of the nineteenth century down to the 
outbreak of the First World War relations between the Hungarian 
government and its large Rumanian minority1 steadily deteriorated. 
On the one side, the leaders of the principal Magyar political parties 
and factions intensified their efforts to transform multinational Hun- 
gary into a Magyar national state. On the other side, Rumanian 
leaders tried to shore up their defenses by strengthening existing 
autonomous national institutions such as the Greek Catholic and 
Orthodox churches and schools and by creating new ones such as 
banks and agricultural cooperatives. The most perceptible result of 
this struggle was the continued isolation of the Rumanian population 
as a whole from the political and social life of Greater Hungary. 
Rumanian leaders had set forth their position at a series of confer- 
ences of the National Party, which had dominated Rumanian political 
activity since its founding in 1881. At the heart of successive formu- 
lations of a national program lay unbending opposition to the new, 
centralized Hungarian state created by the Austro-Hungarian Com- 
promise of 1867 along with the demand for wide-ranging political, 
cultural, and economic autonomy. 
Characteristic of the Magyar nationalist position in these years was 
the policy pursued by ~ e z s o "  Banffy, Prime Minister from 1895 to 
1899. A consistent champion of the "unitary Magyar national state" 
and of the forcible assimilation of the minorities, he rejected the 
whole idea of national equality as merely the first step in the dissolu- 
tion of historical Hungary. To counteract the "centrifugal tenden-
cies" of the minorities he demanded a greater concentration of power 
in the central organs of the state and, concomitantly, a drastic cur- 
tailment of the autonomy of all minority institutions which served 
contrary ends.2 Rumanian. churches and schools were the prime 
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targets of this campaign of assimilation which, moreover, showed no 
sign of slackening under Banffy's successors. The high point was 
undoubtedly the so-called Apponyi Law of 1907, which imposed se- 
vere penalties on minority church schools whose teachers and pupils 
failed to attain the prescribed level of competence in Magyar. This 
law probably contributed more than any other single act between 1900 
and 1914 to the poisoning of relations between the Hungarian gov- 
ernment and its Rumanian citizen^.^ 
Despite this heritage of hostility and suspicion, there were men on 
both sides who believed that a compromise between the Hungarian 
government and the Rumanian National Party was not only possible 
but, in the long run, was inevitable. An opportunity for reconciliation 
presented itself with the coming to power of a new government in the 
spring of 1910. 
This paper will examine what turned out to be the final effort at 
compromise: the negotiations between the Hungarian government and 
the Rumanian National Party from July 1910 to November 1914. The 
direction they took offers considerable insight into the nature of the 
nationality problem in Hungary and suggests why it had become 
intractable. 
To Istvan Tisza (1861-1918),4 the dominant Hungarian political figure 
of the period, belongs the merit of having initiated discussions with 
Rumanian leaders. As the head of the National Party of Work from 
1910 on and as prime minister from 1913 to 1917, he exercised a 
decisive influence on Hungarian political life. In the elections of June 
1910 his party had won an impressive victory (258 seats in parliament 
to fifty-five for its nearest rival), and he thought the time had come to 
effect a comprehensive settlement of the nationality problem on his 
terms. This matter had preoccupied him for many years, but his hopes 
for a rapprochement with the Rumanians and Slavs during his first 
prime-ministership (1903-1905) had been dashed by the unexpected 
defeat of his party in the parliamentary elections of 1905 and his 
Istvan Dolmanyos, "Kritik der Lex Apponyi," in Die nationale Frage in der 
~sterreichisch-~ n ~ a r i s c h e nMonarchie, 1900-1918, ed. Peter Hanik (Budapest, 1966), 
pp. 246-288. 
There is no satisfactory biography of Tisza. See Gusztav Gratz, A dualizmus kora, 
vol. 2 (Budapest, 1934) for a sympathetic view. A contemporary Hungarian assessment 
of his policies may be found in Magyarorszag tortdnete, 1890-1918, ed. Peter Hanak (2 
vols; Budapest, 1978). This is volume 7 of Magyarorszag tortinete tiz kotetben, in 
course of publication under the auspices of the Institute of History of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences. 
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temporary withdrawal from active politic^.^ Nonetheless, a solution 
of the nationality problem remained high on his list of priorities, and 
during the spirited election campaign in 1910 he discussed Magyar- 
Rumanian relations in a frank and conciliatory manner unusual for a 
Hungarian political leader of the p e r i ~ d . ~  
Tisza embarked on his mission to settle the nationality problem not, 
in the first instance, to satisfy the minorities, but to strengthen the 
Hungarian state. In his view, the future of Hungary as a sovereign 
state was dependent upon the continued viability of the dualist system 
and the maintenance of Austria-Hungary as a major European power. 
It seemed axiomatic to him that a modus vivendi between the Hunga- 
rian government and the Rumanians and Slavs would promote these 
ends by ensuring internal tranquility and by consolidating existing 
constitutional structures. Then, too, such a demonstration of the inner 
strength and cohesiveness of the state would discourage irredentist 
tendencies among the Rumanian and Serb minorities and convince the 
neighboring Rumanian and Serbian kingdoms just how fanciful their 
hopes were of satisfying their territorial ambitions at the expense of 
H ~ n g a r y . ~Finally, as he saw the process unfold, a strong Austria- 
Hungary would enhance the prestige of the Triple Alliance and would 
draw Rumania and Serbia out of the Russian and into the Austrian 
orbit once and for all. 
Although Tisza's aim was a general peace with all the nationalities, 
he decided to concentrate his efforts on the Rumanians because he 
regarded them as the key to any enduring settlement. They impressed 
him as better organized politically than the Serbs and more resistant 
to assimilation than the Slovaks. Moreover, the Rumanians were the 
largest minority (over 16 percent of the population of Hungary, 
excluding Croatia). Hence, if they could be brought into the 
mainstream of public life, Tisza was convinced that they could play a 
crucial positive role in the development of Hungary. But if they 
remained alienated, then, he feared, their role could have only "nega- 
tive consequences." It was precisely the failure of the Rumanians to 
participate fully in Hungarian political and social life that most dis- 
turbed him. In his view, they presented special obstacles to assimila- 
tion: their Greek Catholic and Orthodox faiths kept them apart and 
Zoltan Szasz, "A roman kerdes Tisza Istvan els6 kormanyanak politikajaban," 
Torrtnelmi Szemle 11, no. 3 (1968): 254293. 
Istvan Tisza, Kepviseldhazi besze'dei, vol. 4 (Budapest, 1937), pp. 367-368: Speech 
in Arad, May 19, 1910. 
Magyar Orszagos Leve l t i ,  Budapest: Miniszterelnokseg, 1904. XV. 3266: Tisza to 
Foreign Ministry, July 6, 1904. (Henceforth, OL.) 
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prevented the "normal" influences of Hungarian Roman Catholicism 
from working as it had on the Slovaks, and the great mass of the 
population was agricultural and rural, while the commercial and in- 
dustrial middle class, urban dwellers most exposed to cosmopolitan 
influences, remained small and parochial. Tisza was also disturbed by 
the relations of the National Party with politicians in Bucharest and 
by the strong sense of national solidarity that united Rumanians on 
both sides of the border-all, for him, potential threats to the territo- 
rial integrity of Hungary. Yet, he discerned a special bond between 
Magyars and Rumanians. He regarded the two peoples as natural 
allies who over the centuries had been drawn together to defend each 
other against the "Slavic threat," especially Russian "Pan-Slavic 
designs." Although the alleged Russian threat to Eastern Europe was 
a convenient ploy that both sides were to use to try to gain conces- 
sions, the idea of the Magyars and Rumanians as "an island in a 
Slavic sea" had had a long and not unimportant history in the 
nineteenth c e n t ~ r y . ~  
As a method of settling differences with the Rumanians Tisza fa- 
vored persuasion rather than the force and intimidation used by 
Banffy and others among his predecessors. But he was no less deter- 
mined than they to bring the Rumanians firmly under the control of 
the state. Despite several decades of the steady curtailment of their 
activities, Tisza thought the Rumanians still enjoyed too great politi- 
cal and cultural autonomy. He was alarmed by their open hostility to 
the government, which, in his view, could only stir irredentist ambi- 
tions. He cited as an example the two Rumanian churches, which 
seemed to him to behave almost like states within a state, because of 
the administrative and school autonomy they exercised. It worried 
him that their links with the' state were so "tenuous" and that they 
"interposed themselves" between their faithful and the state, a situa- 
tion fraught with danger in times of international crisis when the 
whole population might easily "fall into Rumania's lap."9 Nor was 
independent political activity by the Rumanians to his liking. He 
complained that by running its own slate of candidates in parliamen- 
tary elections the Rumanian National Party simply drove Magyars 
and Rumanians farther apart, and he looked forward to the time when 
minority political parties would fuse with one or more Magyar 
parties.1° His reluctance to contact leaders of the National Party 
Keith Hitchins, "The Rumanians of Transylvania and the Congress of Nation- 
alities," Slavonic and East European Review 48, no. 112 (1970): 389-391. 
Szasz, "A roman kerdes," p. 286: Tisza to joint Foreign Minister Agenor 
Goluchowski, April 29, 1904. 
' O  Tisza, Kepviseldhazi beszedei, vol. 3 (Budapest, 1937), p. 522. 
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stemmed from a determination to eliminate all political organizations 
based upon nationality as incompatible with the unity of the state and 
the principle of the single Magyar political nation. 
For Tisza, then, the main tasks at hand were to reverse the trend of 
alienation and to integrate the leading elements of Rumanian society 
into the structure of Hungarian social and political life. He turned his 
attention to the business and professional classes and the higher 
clergy, for he judged that they were far more susceptible to the 
attractions of modern society than the compact, patriarchal rural 
masses. He was certain that once the educated had been won over, 
the peasantry would quickly fall into line, since, given the largely 
undifferentiated nature of Rumanian society, class antagonisms hardly 
existed. He was no less aware than Rumanian leaders of the fact that 
when class antagonism manifested itself, it usually pitted Rumanian 
peasantry and petty bourgeoisie against Magyar landlords and great 
bourgeoisie, thereby reinforcing national antagonism. 
To accomplish his goals Tisza intended to listen to Rumanian griev- 
ances and to grant modest concessions. But he never wavered in his 
adherence to the fundamental principles that had guided all his pre- 
decessors. His devotion to the conception of Hungary as a Magyar 
national state and his determination to maintain Magyar political 
supremacy as the guarantee of the unity of that state are the keys to 
an understanding of his handling of the Rumanian question (and the 
nationality problem in general). 
Tisza chose to begin his dialogue with the Rumanians with Ioan 
Mihu (1854-1927), a large landowner and banker. Mihu was accept- 
able to Tisza because he was a respected moderate who had remained 
apart from political groupings and had shown a willingness to work 
within the existing constitutional system.ll Mihu had first attracted 
Tisza's attention in 1902, when in an open letter that caused a sensa- 
tion he called for the elimination from the National Party program of 
1881 of articles demanding the restoration of Transylvanian autonomy 
and opposing the dualist system.12 By dealing with Mihu, Tisza could 
avoid direct contacts with the Rumanian National Party and any 
recognition of it as the legal representative of the Rumanians. Yet 
Mihu, through his extensive relations with Rumanian politicians, 
could keep Tisza fully informed of the state of Rumanian public 
opinion and could, if necessary, serve as an intermediary between 
him and the National Party. 
" OL: Miniszterelnokseg, 1904.XVI. 152-3384: Report of the f6ispan of Hunyad 
(Hunedoara) County, July 29, 1904. 
I Z  Libertatea (OrQtie), February 23lMarch 8, 1902. 
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For his part, Mihu was receptive to Tisza's offer because he saw in 
the prospective modus vivendi with the government an opportunity at 
long last to make significant improvements in the cultural and eco- 
nomic situation of his people. He thus represented a growing element 
within the National Party leadership which advocated the abandon- 
ment of the maximum program of 1881 in favor of short-term, attain- 
able goals. Mihu and his associates prided themselves on being realists; 
they could perceive neither in the political and economic resources of 
the Rumanians nor in the international situation any hope of achieving 
the ideal of national autonomy or of a federalized Austria-Hungary. 
Although Mihu could appreciate why Rumanian leaders had pursued 
an intransigent policy since 1867, he pointed out that they had nothing 
substantial to show for their efforts. Instead of forever pursuing the 
unattainable, he urged them to turn their attention to creating the 
conditions necessary for cultural and economic advancement; he was 
certain that an improvement in their political status would follow in 
due course. 
Despite the commanding political and economic position of the 
Magyars, Mihu entered the negotiations with Tisza convinced that the 
Rumanian bargaining position was far from hopeless. He noted that 
the Magyars had had no greater success than the Rumanians in 
achieving their national ambitions, for they were no closer now to 
transforming Hungary into a Magyar national state than they had been 
a half-century earlier. Mihu saw no possibility of their doing so in the 
future, either, because the "tide of history" was running against 
ethnic assimilation. Democracy and the national ideal, which, in his 
view, now determined the standard of political behavior in Europe, 
would not permit the "annihilation" of minorities. As for the Ruma- 
nians in Hungary, he did not doubt for a moment that they would 
survive all attempts to deprive them of their "national being" because 
they had awakened to a full self-consciousness of their unique charac- 
ter and destiny and because they did not stand alone, but formed part 
of a greater ethnic community led by the Kingdom of Rumania. 
At their first meeting on July 23, 1910 in Budapest, Tisza and Mihu 
spent nearly three hours laying the groundwork for more detailed 
negotiations later. Tisza emphasized the timeliness of a Magyar-
Rumanian rapprochement. He drew Mihu's attention to the "Slav 
problem" in Austria-Hungary, which had been "exacerbated" by the 
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, and in Eastern Europe 
as a whole, which was threatened "as never before" by Russia's 
l 3  loan Mihu, Spicuiri din gind~trile mele, ed. Silviu Dragomir (Sibiu, 1938), pp. 4-6, 
17. 
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expansionist ambitions. He warned that only an alliance of Austria- 
Hungary, Germany, and Rumania could check the Slavic advance, 
and he admitted that sustained cooperation among the three would be 
impossible so long as the Rumanians of Hungary remained disaf- 
fected. But he left no doubt that domestic problems were his overrid- 
ing concern. He recognized that an understanding with the Rumanians 
was essential for the consolidation of the Hungarian state, a goal, he 
informed Mihu, he was determined to achieve at all cost. He pro- 
fessed to see no reason for the intransigence of the Rumanians be- 
cause in essence the Magyars were asking only that they accept the 
existing form of the Hungarian state, in return for which the govern- 
ment would do everything in its power to assure their "normal" 
development. 
We do not know precisely what Mihu's response was. In any case, 
it is unlikely that he made specific proposals because he regarded his 
role as that of a factfinder and middleman and he did not presume to 
speak on behalf of the National Party or anyone else. Two days after 
his meeting with Tisza he discussed a Magyar-Rumanian accord with 
Prime Minister Karoly Khuen-Hedervary. More cautious than Tisza, 
Khuen-Hedervary made no commitments, but in concert with Tisza 
he asked Mihu to submit a list of Rumanian grievances as a basis for 
further discussion and possible government action.14 
Mihu spent the rest of the summer consulting with the leaders of 
the National Party. He found them willing enough to continue the 
dialogue with Tisza and Khuen-Hedervary but extremely skeptical 
about the possibility of a genuine rapprochement. Of greatest impor- 
tance were his discussions with Alexandru Vaida and Iuliu Maniu, 
both influential members of the party's executive committee and both 
suspicious of Tisza's motives. 
Vaida (1872-1950),15 a National Party deputy in parliament since 
1906, rejected out of hand the idea of Hungary as a Magyar national 
state, for the creation of such an entity, in his view, would mean the 
complete subjugation of the minorities. Deeply influenced by the 
writings of Aurel C. Popovici, an advocate of the federalization of 
Austria-Hungary, a process he had described in his famous Die Ver- 
einigten Staaten von ~ r o s s - ~ s t e r r e i c h  (1906), Vaida looked to Vienna 
l 4  Ibid., p p  24-25. 
There is no biography of Vaida. One may consult: Georg Franz, "Alexander 
Vaida-Voevod und die Reformplane Erzherzog Franz Ferdinands," Siidost-For-
schungen 12 (1953): 17b191, and Keith Hitchins, The Nationality Problem in Austria- 
Hungary. The Reports of Alexander Vaida to Archduke Franz Ferdinand's Chancellery 
(Leiden, 1974), pp. ix-xvii. IHenceforth, Vaida.) 
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for support against Magyar nationalism. He could even contemplate 
the eventual amalgamation of Rumania and the Balkan states with the 
Dual Monarchy into a vast Danubian federation, as a means of 
guaranteeing the free development and economic prosperity of all its 
members. He thought Austria was the ideal choice to head this new 
entity, because of her economic and cultural attainments, her rela- 
tively tolerant nationality policy, and her close ties to Germany.16 
Like many representatives of the minorities, Vaida placed great 
hopes for a revision of the dualist system in the heir to the throne, 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Convinced that he would rein in the 
Magyars and introduce, if not federalism, then at least some form of 
national autonomy, Vaida became a faithful member of that small 
group of national leaders who regularly supplied Franz Ferdinand 
with information and advice about conditions in Hungary. Vaida's 
reports relentlessly exposed the undemocratic character of the Hun- 
garian political system and the "chauvinism" and "disloyalty" of 
Magyar politicians, including Tisza.17 He held Tisza responsible for 
the crushing defeat of the National Party in the 1910 elections, action 
he attributed to Tisza's contempt for democratic processes and to his 
refusal to deal with the Rumanians as equals.lg It is little wonder, 
then, that he thought Tisza and Khuen-Hendervary were engaged in a 
charade and wished merely to persuade Vienna and European public 
opinion that a new era in nationality relations in Hungary had begun. 
Painfully aware of Rumanian weakness, Vaida intended to coordinate 
the actions of the National Party with the broader objectives of Franz 
Ferdinand and his entourage. Accordingly, in August 1910 he wrote to 
the Archduke's chancellery seeking advice on how he and his col- 
leagues should react to Tisza's initiative.19 
Iuliu Maniu (1873-1950),20 the legal counsel for the Greek Catholic 
diocese of Translyvania and a National Party deputy in parliament 
from 1906 to 1910, shared the views of his friend Vaida on the 
16 Peregrinus [Alexander Vaida-Voevod], "Die vereinigten Donaustaaten," dster-
reichische Rundschau 18 (February 1909): 257-260. 
l 7  Hitchins, Vaida, pp. x-xiv; 91-93: Vaida's report of July 5, 1909. 
I s  Arhiva Istorics Centrals a Statului, Bucharest. Fonduri personale: Vaida, p. 116: 
Audience with Franz Ferdinand, November 23, 1910. This document, consisting of 154 
typewritten pages, contains Vaida's recollections of his association with Franz Fer- 
dinand. 
l9 Hitchins, Vaida, pp. 174-5: Vaida to Alexander Brosch von Aarenau, August 8, 
1910; Mihu, Spicuiri, p. 157: Vaida to Mihu, August 19, 1910. 
20 There is no up-to-date biography of Maniu. One may consult: Viorel V. Tilea, Iuliu 
Maniu. Der Mann und das Werk (Hermannstadt, 1927), and Sever Stoica, Iuliu Maniu 
(Cluj, 1932). 
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prospects of a Magyar-Rumanian accord. He was skeptical about the 
intention of the government to offer the Rumanians substantial 
guarantees of their national existence and cited its behavior in the 
recent elections, "a campaign of extermination" against the National 
Party, as evidence of its true feelings toward the m i n~ r i t i e s . ~~  He 
thought that the impetus for negotiations had come from Vienna and 
that Tisza was simply using peace overtures to the minorities to 
deflect criticism of the government's traditional nationality policy. 
Maniu's own goal was national autonomy, and, like Vaida, he 
thought a federalization of the Monarchy was one way to achieve it. 
But unlike Vaida, he looked beyond questions of immediate tactics to 
the underlying political and social structure of Hungary. He found it 
wanting in most respects. Among the reforms he deemed essential 
was universal suffrage. The right to vote seemed to him the key to a 
solution of the nationality problem because it would allow each ethnic 
group proportional representation in parliament and would enable 
each to organize itself on an autonomous basis in those areas where it 
formed a majority of the population. He thought that universal suf- 
frage would also lead to an improvement in living standards and an 
acceleration of social development because it would enable the 
minorities to gain a larger share of economic power than they could 
ever hope to have under a system dominated by the "Magyar oligar- 
c h ~ . " ~ ~  
Mihu's conversations with Tisza and Khuen-Hedervary had not 
changed Maniu's overall assessment of the situation, but he hesitated 
to reject Tisza'a overtures outright in deference to "important per-
sons" in Vienna, who, he had it on good authority, had intervened on 
behalf of the Rumanians. He urged Mihu to ascertain as quickly. as 
possible if the government were seriously interested in a rapproche- 
ment. If it were not, he wanted to bring the whole affair to a close at 
once in order to prevent the government from using long, drawn-out 
negotiations to sow dissension among the R ~ma n i a n s . ~ ~  
Mihu tried to persuade Maniu, Vaida, and other National Party 
leaders to base their policies on a pragmatic assessment of existing 
circumstances, not on some abstract ideal or on expectations of what 
others might do for them. In particular, he thought it foolish to count 
2' Biblioteca Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romgnia, Bucharest. Fondul corespon- 
denfa: Iuliu Maniu to Valeriu Braniyte, June 12, 1910. (Henceforth, BARSR.) 
2Z Ibid. Fondul corespondenfa: Maniu to Braniyte, July 14, 1910; Iuliu Maniu, Dis-
cursuri parlamentare 29 maiu-31 iulie 1906 (Blaj, 1906), pp. 7-8, 10: Speech in parlia- 
ment, May 29, 1906. 
23 Mihu, Spicuiri, pp. 131-133: Maniu to Mihu, August 3,  1910. 
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upon the intervention of Franz Ferdinand to improve their lot, for, as 
he saw it, the Archduke could not alter the structure of the Monarchy 
to suit himself or to please the Rumanians. Moreover, he had said as 
much at an audience for two Transylvanian Rumanian churchmen, 
Miron Cristea, a member of the Orthodox metropolitan consistory, 
and Augustin Bunea, a canon of the Greek Catholic metropolitanate, 
in March 1908. He had urged them to persevere in their loyalty to the 
dynasty and promised that when he was in a position to do so, he 
would attempt to gain more equitable treatment for the minorities and 
introduce universal suffrage.24 For Mihu, such vague expressions of 
good will could not possibly form the basis of a national program. He 
also dismissed as fanciful the often-expressed hope that foreign states 
would come to the aid of the Rumanians. He saw no immediate 
prospect of changes in the international situation that would benefit 
their cause.25 
Instead of "chimeras," Mihu urged party leaders to accept his own 
formula: recognition of the unity and indivisibility of the Hungarian 
state and a commitment to make it strong and prosperous in return for 
the enactment by the government of all necessary measures to protect 
and foster the development of the Rumanian nationality. Once these 
principles had been agreed to, he was certain that the Rumanians 
would be able to organize a strong political party and enter into 
"productive relationships" with Magyar parties. In the final analysis, 
he argued, the future of the Rumanians of Hungary did not depend 
upon their intransigence but upon their vitality.26 
In August the National Party executive committee decided reluc- 
tantly to participate in further discussions with Tisza and Khuen- 
Hedervary. On September 5 it approved the text of a memorandum 
drawn up by several committee members and Mihu, which the latter 
presented to Khuen-HedervAry on the 12th. Its twenty-three articles 
had but one objective-national autonomy-and represented the most 
extreme formulation of that idea the Rumanians had ever presented to 
higher authority (either Hungarian or Austrian). There was no long 
preamble containing historical and legal justifications for their de- 
mands as in previous documents of this sort. Rather, its authors went 
directly to the heart of the matter. They demanded: 1) Political 
autonomy-the right to organize and manage a political party on the 
same basis as all other parties; the introduction of universal suffrage, 
24 Gabor G. KemBny, Iratok a nemzetise'gi ktrde's tortinete'hez Magyarorszagon a 
dualizmus koraban, vol. 5 (19061913) (Budapest, 1971), pp. 234-239. 
ZS Mihu, Spicuiri, pp. 33-35. 
26 Hitchins, Vaida,  p. 175: Vaida's report of August 8, 1910. 
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or if that were not possible at once, an end to electoral abuses and a 
broadening of the franchise; and the creation of fifty Rumanian elec- 
toral districts; 2) Administrative autonomy-the appointment of 
Rumanian functionaries in Rumanian-inhabited areas, and the use of 
Rumanian in all administrative and judicial bodies having direct con- 
tact with the citizenry; 3) Church autonomy-the management of 
internal affairs in accordance with norms guaranteed by civil and 
church law, and state financial support in the same proportion as that 
accorded Protestant churches; 4) Educational autonomy-the right of 
churches and communities to establish and maintain elementary 
schools; the use of Rumanian as the language of instruction in all 
elementary schools that catered to Rumanian pupils; the construction 
at state expense of three middle schools in Rumanian-inhabited areas 
with Rumanian as the language of instruction; and the establishment 
of a Rumanian section in the Ministry of Education and Cults; and 5) 
Economic autonomy-the granting of regular state subsidies to de- 
velop Rumanian-inhabited areas.z7 
The memorandum was the main topic of discussion at Mihu's 
second meeting with Tisza on September 24. The prospects for a 
breakthrough were slim, for Tisza had already informed Mihu that 
certain points were unac~ep t ab l e .~~  Nonetheless, he went through the 
memorandum with Mihu point by point. By and large, he approved 
the items calling for state support for churches and education as they 
stood with a few minor changes, and he agreed in principle to support 
Rumanian economic aspirations. But he refused to commit himself to 
any action that would recognize the Rumanians as a separate political 
entity entitled to proportional representation at all levels of govern- 
ment. He said nothing about the fifty Rumanian electoral districts and 
rejected universal suffrage, proposing instead an extension of the 
franchise to favor the educated and well-to-do. He also insisted that 
the language of administration and of the courts must continue to be 
Magyar, but agreed that Rumanian could supplement it in local bodies 
and that officials who had regular contact with the people should 
possess the necessary language competence. He declared that Ruma- 
nians would be welcome at all levels of administration, but he refused 
to set quotas. He agreed to the appointment of Rumanian councillors 
in the Ministry of Education and Cults, but he thought a Rumanian 
section was unnecessary. Finally, he accepted in principle the de- 
mand of the Rumanians to have their own political organization, but 
he did not mention the National Party.29 
27 Mihu, Spicuiri, pp. 159-164. 

28 Ibid., pp, 177-8: Tisza to Mihu, September 10, 1910. 

29 Ibid., pp. 179-180. 
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Mihu replied that the concessions Tisza was contemplating would 
not satisfy the Rumanians completely, but he expressed the belief that 
if carried out fully and with dispatch, they would reduce the "ex- 
treme hostility" felt by Rumanians toward the government and would 
eventually lead to a comprehensive settlement. That seemed accept- 
able to Tisza, who suggested that remaining differences could be 
worked out at a conference of representatives of both sides. The two 
men agreed that the future of the negotiations depended upon what 
the Rumanian side was willing to offer in exchange for the govern- 
ment's concessions, but they clearly harbored doubts about the out- 
come of the process they had set in motion. Mihu advised Tisza that 
Rumanian leaders would consider making a final settlement only if 
they obtained solid guarantees of their nation's existence and future 
development. For his part, Tisza warned against the raising of 
"exaggerated demands" and urged the Rumanians to remember that 
Magyar public opinion, extremely sensitive to any diminution of the 
Magyar character of the state, had to be won over to the idea of a 
r appr~chement .~~  
The response of the National Party executive committee was not in 
the least encouraging. At a meeting on October 4 its members debated 
Tisza's offer at length, but concluded that no substantial change in the 
government's attitude toward the Rumanians had occurred. They 
were particularly upset by Tisza's failure to recognize the legal status 
of their party and bitterly recalled the idea he had raised in the past 
about the eventual amalgamation of the National Party with one or 
more Magyar parties once the terms of a comprehensive agreement 
had been carried out. Although aware of their own weak bargaining 
position, they were confident that Rumania's attachment to the Triple 
Alliance would eventually prove decisive in persuading the Magyars 
to come to terms.31 
Mihu continued his work of persuasion, but slowly lost hope of an 
agreement. He received little encouragement from anyone. The Na- 
tional Party refused to give him a clear mandate to proceed with his 
negotiations. Maniu was undecided; Vaida, who thought Mihu naive 
in believing that the Magyars would willingly give up any of their 
privileges, would not move without instructions from Franz Fer-
d i r ~ a n d ; ~ ~and other party leaders awaited tangible signs of the gov- 
'O Ibid., pp. 48-51. 
BARSR, Cluj. Arhiva Istoric5: Collection of Documents from the Hungarian 
Ministry of the Interior: Report of the Mayor of Cluj to the Ministry of the Interior, 
October 6, 1910. 
3Z Arhiva Istoric5 Central5 a Statului, Bucharest. Fonduri personale: Vaida, pp. 
116-118, 123: Audience with Franz Ferdinand, November 23, 1910. 
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ernment's sincerity. No support came from Vienna either. Nor did 
Mihu expect any. He had never given any credence to the idea, 
entertained by many of his colleagues, that the court was behind the 
negotiations. The whole manner in which the undertaking had been 
conducted had convinced him that it had come about through Tisza's 
personal initiative. 33 
Increasingly discouraged, Mihu nevertheless persevered because he 
was convinced that a settlement of Magyar-Rumanian differences was 
both necessary and inevitable. Owing to the mixed nature of the 
population in almost all areas inhabited by the Rumanians, the nation- 
ality problem, in his view, simply would not go away by itself whether 
the territory remained a part of Hungary or fell under the control of 
Rumania the next day; both Magyars and Rumanians had awakened 
to a full consciousness of themselves and neither, therefore, could be 
subjugated or assimilated by the other. The final blow to his hopes 
was a letter from Khuen-Hedervary on October 27, informing him 
that the memorandum of September 12 did not offer a "suitable 
basis" for further discussions. 
At the beginning of November the executive committee of the 
National Party decided to suspend further contacts with Tisza. Ma- 
niu's arguments apparently carried the day: the Rumanians could not 
recognize the existing constitutional system of Hungary, which was 
the fundamental condition set by Tisza for an agreement, until the 
government had granted them "institutional guarantees" of their na- 
tional existence. 
Although a majority of the committee supported Maniu, some of his 
colleagues were more flexible. Among the latter was Vasile Goldi~ 
(1862-1934),34 a respected social theorist who belonged to a circle of 
liberal Magyar political thinkers and sociologists. He thought, as 
Mihu did, that a settlement of the nationality problem must come 
eventually and then only by compromise. As he saw the situation, 
Magyar politicians would have to give up the notion that Hungary 
could ever be a national state, and the Rumanians would have to 
realize that they could never form a state within a state. He therefore 
urged his colleagues to abandon the intransigent policy they had 
pursued since 1881 because it had proved ineffective as a means of 
achieving the only goal that mattered-the preservation of their na- 
tional existence.35 To keep the lines of communication open to Tisza 
33  BARSR, Bucharest. Fondul corespondenJa: Mihu to Branigte, October 28, 1910. 
34  On Goldig's role in the national movement, see: Gheorghe yora, Vasile Go ld i~ ,  
militant pentru desdvir~irea idealului na$ional (Timigoara, 1980). 
3S Mihu, Spicuiri, pp. 211-213, 218, 223-224: Goldi~to Mihu, November 9, 12, and 
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and Khuen-Hendervary while party leaders reexamined their position, 
Goldi~ urged Mihu to seek recognition of the National Party "in a 
constitutional sense." He was certain that such a concession would 
allay the suspicions his colleagues harbored about Magyar sincerity 
and would bring them closer to a general peace. 
Although Mihu had decided to terminate his mission after the re- 
ceipt of Khuen-Hedervary's letter, he continued to sound out opin- 
ion from all the parties concerned. In December 1910 he visited 
Bucharest where he met leaders of the Liberal and Conservative 
parties and was received by King Carol. All of them encouraged him 
to persevere in his efforts to find a solution to the Rumanian-Magyar 
impasse.36 
Mihu had two more conversations with Tisza, on January 14 and 
February 28, 191 1. Neither revealed any change of position since the 
previous September. At the latter meeting Mihu advised Tisza that 
there could be little hope of a reconciliation until the franchise had 
been modified sufficiently to allow the Rumanians proportional rep- 
resentation in parliament and until specific measures had been taken 
to satisfy their church, school, and economic grievances. Tisza 
thanked him for his straightforward representation of the Rumanian 
position, but declined to accept his views.37 With this, Mihu's role in 
the Magyar-Rumanian negotiations came to an end. 
Direct contact between Tisza and the Rumanians remained suspended 
for nearly two years. For most of this period the National Party was 
beset by an internal struggle for power, which left it temporarily in 
disarray and incapable of pursuing serious negotiations with the gov- 
ernment.38 Another reason for inactivity was the lack of urgency felt 
by Tisza and other Magyar leaders to settle the Rumanian question. 
Moreover, no particular pressure was exerted on Tisza by Vienna to 
negotiate, a situation that bears out the assumption of Mihu (and 
others) that the original impetus had indeed come from Tisza. 
The new round of negotiations, which began in January 1913 and 
lasted, with interruptions, until February 1914, coincided with impor- 
tant changes in the balance of power among the states of southeastern 
Europe and intensified diplomatic activity on the part of the great 
16, 1910; BARSR, Bucharest. Fondul corespondenla: Goldig to Brani~te,  November 9, 
1910. 
36 Mihu, Spicuiri, pp. 79-82. 
3 7  Ibid., p. 91 
38 Lucian Boia, "Contribulii privind mi~carea naJional5 a romiinilor din Transilvania 
in anii 1910-1914," Studii. Revistd de Istorie 25, no. 4 (1972): 783-794. 
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powers. A growing estrangement between the Dual Monarchy and 
Rumania, and the emergence of the latter as an independent force in 
Balkan affairs could not but have repercussions on Magyar-Rumanian 
relations. The participation of Rumania in the Balkan Wars had 
brought both military and diplomatic prestige. With enhanced self- 
confidence her leaders became more receptive to overtures' from 
Russia and the Entente, a new departure in foreign policy nourished 
by Austria's failure to support Rumania in the recent Balkan crisis.39 
In the fall of 1912 Tisza began to explore ways of reviving the 
negotiations. Although the joint foreign minister, Leopold von Berch- 
told, urged him to use his influence with the Hungarian government to 
improve its relations with the Rumanian minority in order to keep 
Rumania from '"lipping out of our hands,"40 foreign policy objectives 
were of secondary importance to him. Tisza's aim remained what it 
had been in 1910-the internal consolidation of Hungary. 
Although it had been evident in his dealings with Mihu that the 
participation of the Rumanian National Party was essential if his 
initiative was to succeed, Tisza was reluctant to treat directly with its 
representatives. He much preferred to reestablish contact with Mihu 
or negotiate with the Greek Catholic and Orthodox bishops. He finally 
accepted a compromise suggested by Ion I. C . Brfitianu, the leader of 
the Liberal Party in Rumania. BrSitianu, who preferred France to 
Austria, but whose interest in the nationality problem in Hungary 
warmed as his perception of political and diplomatic advantages to be 
won became clearer, proposed that Teodor Mihali (1855-1934), a 
National Party deputy in the Hungarian parliament since 1905 and a 
member of the party's executive committee, serve as an intermediary. 
After some hesitation Tisza agreed because Mihali enjoyed the re-
spect of his colleagues and, hence, could speak with authority, and 
because he was a moderate who, like Mihu, had shown a willingness 
to reach a modus vivendi with the government. Tisza thus made an 
important concession that seemed to suggest official recognition of the 
National Party and a renunciation of his plan to dissolve political 
parties organized on the basis of nationality. On December 18 he 
informed Mihali that he was ready to begin discussion^.^^ 
The prospects for success were dim, as Rumanian leaders main- 
tained their distance from the government. Maniu and Goldia con-
39 For a recent assessment of Rumanian foreign policy during this period, see: 
Gheorghe Nicolae Cgzan and yerban Rgdulescu-Zoner, Rorn6nia ji Tripla Alianfd, 
1878-1914 (Bucharest, 1979), pp. 298-389. 
40 Ferenc Poloskei, "Istvan Tisza's Policy toward the Romanian Nationalities [sic] 
on the Eve of World War I," Acta Histor.ica 18, no. 3-4 (1972): 274-275. 
41 Ibid., p. 277. 
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tinued to insist upon the complete restructuring of the Hungarian state 
as a prerequisite for any lasting solution of the nationality problem. In 
Maniu's view, a rapprochement between Magyars and Rumanians 
could occur only when parliament had been reconstituted on a demo- 
cratic basis and when Magyar leaders had abandoned their 
"megalomania" and had recognized certain hard truths about the 
ethnic character of H ~ n g a r y . ~ ~  He pointed out that the Hungarian 
state daily disregarded the natural political and cultural rights of its 
Rumanian citizens and that in its present form it lacked the institu- 
tions necessary to satisfy their needs and aspirations. Under these 
circumstances, he assumed on behalf of the National Party the solemn 
obligation to transform the whole existing apparatus of the state into 
one based upon respect for the unique attributes of every people and 
general human rights.43 AS he saw the problem, such radical changes 
could be brought about only through close cooperation between the 
Court of Vienna and the non-Magyar nationalities. Their first task 
would be to destroy the power of the Magyar "ruling oligarchy," 
which task, he thought, could best be accomplished by abolishing the 
dualist system itself and by granting broad powers of self-government 
to the minorities, powers that would have their source and justifica- 
tion in universal suffrage.44 
Goldi~ also advocated the democratization of Hungarian political 
life as a means of solving the nationality problem, but he saw little 
chance of that happening immediately because it would tip the bal- 
ance in favor of the minorities, a turn of events the Magyar ruling 
parties would never tolerate.4s He characterized as "illusory" and 
"destructive of human progress" attempts by these parties to create a 
unitary Magyar state. Moreover, he was certain that they would fail 
because fundamental economic changes such as the growth of 
capitalism had already initiated an "economic democratization" that 
in time would establish a just balance among the various nationalities. 
For the present, however, Goldi~ showed little inclination to make 
binding commitments to a government that violated its own constitu- 
42 "Declarafiuni asupra chestiunilor actuale politice. Un interviev cu dl. Dr. Iuliu 
Maniu," Revista politic6 gi literar6 (Blaj) 3, no. 4-6 (1910): 112. 
43 Iuliu Maniu, "Scopul politicei nafionale romsnegti," Revista politic2 gi literard 
(Blaj) 3, no. 8 (1911): 272-3. 
44 L.  Bianchi, "Listy Milana Hodiu Sefovi vojenskej kanceliie naslednika tronu 
FrantiSka Ferdinanda v rokoch 1907-1911," Historickj Casopis 18, no. 3 (1970): 
443-447: Promemoria of Milan Hodza and Iuliu Maniu to Franz Ferdinand, December 
25, 1911. 
45 Laszlo (Vasile) Goldi~ ,  A nemzetis&gi k8rdisro"l (Arad, 1912), p. 32. 
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tion by obstructing the political and cultural development of its non- 
Magyar c i t i z e n ~ . ~ ~  
Alexandru Vaida was as distrustful as ever of Tisza. He continued 
to rely upon a strong Habsburg Monarchy led by Austria as the only 
means of thwarting Magyar ambitions and assuring minority rights.47 
Despite misgivings, the leaders of the National Party agreed to 
resume the dialogue with Tisza. On January 12 and 13, 1913 the 
executive committee chose a subcommittee of ten members, including 
Mihali, Maniu, Vaida, and Goldiy, to coordinate policy and tactics, 
and designated three among them-Mihali, Maniu, and Valeriu 
Braniyte (1869-1928), the editor of the newspaper Drapelul of Lugoj 
and a moderate-to conduct the actual negotiations. 
The first meeting between the Committee of Three and Tisza, which 
took place on January 21, was devoted to a recapitulation of the 
latter's views on Magyar-Rumanian relations. Tisza raised again the 
idea that the two people were natural allies and that they must stand 
together with the Germans to prevent the expansion of Russia. It 
followed, so he reasoned, that a strong Magyar national state was the 
best guarantee not only of the free cultural and economic develop- 
ment of the Rumanians of Hungary but also of the independence of 
the Rumanian Kingdom. Although his manner was thus conciliatory, 
he offered his listeners few practical inducements to abandon their 
reserve. He rejected as groundless the accusation that the government 
was pursuing a policy of magyarization, admitting only that occa-
sional abuses had been committed and would be corrected. Although 
he expressed a willingness to work with the National Party to achieve 
mutually beneficial aims, he intimated that as soon as the demands of 
the Rumanians had been satisfied its reason for being would have 
ceased. In parting, he asked the Rumanians to give him a new list of 
desiderata in writing.48 
Two days later, on the 23rd, Maniu and Goldiy presented an elev- 
en-point memorandum to Tisza. It went over essentially the same 
ground as Mihu's of September 12, 1910, but it sharpened the concept 
of autonomy: the language of instruction for Rumanian students in 
both state and church schools at all levels was to be Rumanian; in 
areas inhabited by "compact masses" of Rumanians the language of 
administration and the administrators was to be Rumanian; and the 
46 Ibid., pp. 42, 45, 64. 
47 Alexander Vaida-Voevod, "Slawen, Deutsche, Magyaren und Rumanen," 0ster-
reichische Rundschau 34 (January 1913): 11, and "Jos Austria perfid5," Osterreich-
ische Rundschau 37 (October 1913): 14. 
48 BARSR, Bucharest. Arhiva Valeriu Branigte, 111, 2 a-c: Brani~te 's  typewritten 
summary of the discussions with Tisza. 
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political influence of the Rumanians in public life was to be guaran- 
teed by direct, secret universal suffrage and by the assignment to 
them of one-sixth of the seats in the lower house of parliament, a 
number corresponding to the percentage of Rumanians in the popula- 
tion of H ~ n g a r y . ~ ~  
Tisza sent his reply to Mihali on February 7. His position on the 
Magyar character of the state and on autonomy for the minorities had 
not changed. He rejected the demand for instruction in Rumanian in 
state schools as incompatible with the idea of the Magyar national 
state. Yet, he was willing to promote the study of Rumanian and other 
languages in the middle schools and to continue state aid to church 
schools. As for education at the university level, he insisted that it be 
under state auspices and that the language of instruction be Magyar, 
but he predicted that once "good relations" between the government 
and the Rumanians had been restored, the study of the Rumanian 
language and literature would become more "intensive" than before. 
He rejected the use of Rumanian as the language of administration 
and the exclusive appointment of Rumanian officials in Rumanian- 
inhabited areas as contrary to the best interests of the Magyar na- 
tional state. Although Magyar must remain the primary language of 
state functionaries at all levels, he promised that they would have the 
necessary competence in the languages of the minorities whom they 
were to serve. He thought it desirable that Rumanian intellectuals fill 
administrative positions as their numbers and experience warranted, a 
process he was convinced would accelerate as hostility and suspicion 
on both sides gradually dissipated. Although he did not refer spe- 
cifically to universal suffrage or a quota for Rumanian deputies in 
parliament, he was disposed to extend the franchise to include more 
Rumanians, in accordance with "true power relationships." The lat- 
ter phrase referred to the Rumanians' lack of economic development 
and modest cultural attainments, which, in Tisza's view, disqualified 
them from enjoying voting power or seats in parliament in proportion 
to their numbers. Nonetheless, he assured the Committee of Three 
that the situation would inevitably change in favor of the Rumanians 
as the masses "advanced in culture." As for the Rumanian National 
Party, he appeared to give a little. He repeated his ideas on its 
eventual dissolution, but agreed that in the final analysis it was up to 
the Rumanians themselves to decide whether they wanted a separate 
party. On church autonomy, economic development, and state sup- 
port for cultural activities, he accepted the Rumanian position in 
principle, but here, as with the highly sensitive political and language 
49 Ibid. The memorandum is dated January 23, 1913. 
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questions, he made concessions dependent upon a general and 
vaguely defined "restoration of good relations" between the govern- 
ment and the R uman i a n ~ . ~ ~  
The Committee of Ten discussed Tisza's reply on February 8 and 9 
and concluded that no basis for an agreement existed that would 
reconcile the idea of the Magyar national state with their own demand 
for institutional guarantees of their national existence. A few days 
later Mihu met with Mihali, Maniu, and Braniyte and confirmed their 
assessment. He could discern no change in the principle Tisza had 
enunciated in 1910 that the Magyar political nation alone had created 
and sustained the Hungarian state.51 
There were also other, public, signs that National Party leaders 
were little disposed to make binding agreements with Tisza. In Janu- 
ary and February the party organ, RomLnul of Arad, under the 
editorship of Goldiy, kept up an unrelenting drumbeat of criticism of 
Tisza and the government. Accusing the government of gross viola- 
tions of its own laws, RomLnul castigated its refusal to amend the 
Apponyi education law of 1907 and its continued efforts to extend the 
use of Magyar in minority schools. Even more harsh were the editor- 
ials attacking the government's failure to introduce universal suffrage 
or some other kind of electoral reform that would benefit the 
minorities. Romdnul declared that in matters of the vote the Ruman- 
ians continued to be the victims of "political brigandage," and it 
labeled Tisza's views on the franchise "reactionary" and "Pan-
Magyar" and denounced him personally as a "sophist" and "hypo- 
rite."^^ 
In a strained atmosphere hardly conducive to an accord Mihali, 
Maniu, and Braniyte met Tisza for a point-by-point review of the 
Rumanian memorandum on February 13 and 15. Mihali suggested that 
they divide all the outstanding issues into two categories-the first 
consisting of those matters that could be settled relatively simply and 
the second of those that would require further negotiation and con- 
cessions by both sides. In this way he hoped to use an agreement on 
secondary questions to create an atmosphere of trust in which funda- 
mental disagreements might be overcome. Tisza rejected the idea. He 
wanted a single, comprehensive agreement and therefore refused to 
settle any one point in dispute separate from all the others. 
Cultural questions were taken up first. The Rumanians had little 
5Vbid. 
5 1  Ibid.: Valeriu Brani~te's typewritten notes on the deliberations of the Committee 
of Ten, February 8-17, 1913. 
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success in budging Tisza from his position on the role of Magyar in 
instruction. Although he agreed to "study further" such matters as 
the revision of the Apponyi Law, he went no further than to express a 
hope that solutions could be found if "insurmountable difficulties" on 
other points did not intrude. 
Political matters were paramount. Maniu posed a question that 
went to the very heart of national aspirations: How could the Ruman- 
ians exert an effective influence on the political life of their country? 
How, in other words, could they be assured of a continuous say in 
determining their own future? First, he reviewed the solutions already 
offered by the National Party-electoral reform (he had little hope for 
the passage of a law that would benefit the Rumanians); the restora- 
tion of the autonomy of Transylvania (he recognized the impossibility 
of such an act in the face of government opposition); and national 
autonomy (he admitted that its implementation would lead to the 
federalization of Hungary and put an end to the dual hegemony of the 
Germans and Magyars in the Monarchy, consequences totally unac- 
ceptable to the Magyars)-and then proposed to solve the problem by 
redrawing county boundaries on the basis of nationality and by 
appointing a Rumanian to the cabinet as minister without p o r t f o l i ~ . ~ ~  
The plan was endorsed by his colleagues, who once again argued 
strenuously in favor of the use of their language in administration and 
justice in those counties where their people formed a majority of the 
population. 
All their arguments were to no avail. Tisza rejected out of hand the 
administrative division of the country on the basis of nationality and 
the notion that Rumanians should be administered and judged by 
Rumanians. His position on the language of administration was simi- 
lar. To diminish the role of the Magyar language in the life of the state 
struck him as "incompatible" with the evolution of Hungary during 
the preceding forty years. As for electoral reform, he hinted that a 
"rounding-off" of electoral districts in favor of the Rumanians would 
be possible, but only within the context of a general agreement. 
Matters were thus at an impasse, and by mutual consent the discus- 
sions were adjourned on February 16. 
I11 
Bargaining between Tisza and the Rumanian National Party resumed 
in October 1913. The same Committee of Three represented the 
53 BARSR, Bucharest. Arhiva Valeriu Brani~te:  Brani~te's notes on the conversation 
between the Committee of Three and Tisza. 
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Rumanians, who decided that the eleven-point memorandum of the 
previous January would form the basis of their negotiating position. 
Teodor Mihali sent word to Tisza through the latter's good friend, 
Vasile Hosszu, Rumanian Greek Catholic bishop of Gherla 
(Szamosujvar), that he and his colleagues sincerely desired to end the 
differences between themselves and the g o ~ e r nm e n t . ~ ~  
Such assurances notwithstanding, other evidence suggests that the 
mood of the National Party had hardened and that its estrangement 
from the government and from Hungarian society generally had 
deepened. During the summer of 1913 Romdnul continued its no-
holds-barred attacks on the existing political structure and the mo-
tives of Magyar political leaders. In parliament Mihali himself at- 
tacked the program of the new Tisza government (Tisza had become 
prime minister on June 10) as "noxious" to the welfare of the country 
because it had failed to endorse universal suffrage and to acknowl- 
edge the right of the minorities to protect their ethnic and cultural 
individ~al i ty .~~Editorials in Romdnul warned the Rumanian public 
against entertaining false hopes that Tisza as prime minister would do 
any more to loosen the reins of Magyar domination than he had done 
out of office. Even more ominous for the future of Magyar-Rumanian 
relations were admonitions to Rumanian electors to shun political 
contacts with all Magyars, no matter what their particular orientation 
was. Romdnul declared a vote for a candidate of any Magyar party to 
be a vote for the destruction of the Rumanian nation. According to 
this line of reasoning, not even the Hungarian Social Democratic 
Party had anything tangible to offer the Rumanians because it, too, in 
the final analysis, was bent upon maintaining the supremacy of the 
Magyar race. Nor did Oszkar Jaszi, the well-known sociologist, pro- 
vide any acceptable alternatives. Even though his moderate, demo- 
cratic views on the nationality problem were widely respected by 
Rumanian intellectuals, Romdnul warned that he and his colleagues 
supported language and educational rights for the Rumanians merely 
for "scientific reasons," that is, to raise them to a higher cultural 
level in order to facilitate their a s s im i l a t i ~n .~~  Undoubtedly, much of 
this was rhetoric designed to show the public the combativeness of 
the party and to relieve it of the stigma of negotiating with a regime 
whose policies it had unrelentingly denounced. Public intransigence, 
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then, was good politics.57 Nonetheless, the editorials in Rombnul 
indicate the extent of Rumanian dissatisfaction and suspicion and 
show how little Tisza had been able to modify deeply entrenched 
mental attitudes. 
Of crucial importance for the success of the latest round of negotia- 
tions was the attitude of Maniu. According to Mihali, he wanted to 
end the discussions with Tisza as quickly as possible, so that the 
"great action" could begin.s8 Although it is unclear exactly what 
Maniu had in mind, the "great action" probably referred to some sort 
of coordinated undertaking by Vienna and Bucharest to force the 
Hungarian government to make substantial concessions to the Na- 
tional Party. Yet, these were questions of tactics, which could change 
as circumstances warranted. Maniu never wavered in his commitment 
to his ultimate objective-national self-determination. He set forth his 
ideas on the subject and, in effect, announced his rejection of Tisza's 
program in unequivocal terms in a front-page editorial in Rombnul a 
week after the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest on August 10, 1913, 
ending the second Balkan War. With unconcealed pride he declared 
that the successes of the Rumanian Kingdom in the recent conflict 
had given the Rumanians of Hungary renewed faith that they had 
been born for something higher than service to a master race. He 
qualified the victory of the Balkan allies over the Ottoman Empire as 
a reaffirmation of the principle of nationality and a step forward in the 
free development of European peoples, and he predicted that the 
Rumanians of Hungary would not have to endure the status of 
"helots" much longer.s9 
A meeting between the Committee of Three and Tisza on October 
23 brought no substantive changes in the position of either side. Tisza 
had modified his earlier stand on the eleven points to the extent that 
he was now prepared to discuss the allocation of a certain number of 
"safe" electoral districts to the Rumanians. He estimated the number 
of districts with solid Rumanian majorities at thirty, but declined to 
name them. Instead, he made this and all other concessions depen- 
dent upon "changes in the behavior of the Rumanians": first of all, 
the "national movement," by which he meant opposition to the 
government and the isolation of the Rumanians from Hungarian soci- 
ety, would have to cease; second, if a general agreement were 
reached, the National Party would have to make a public declaration 
57  REKL: Vasile Hosszu to Tisza, September 19, 1913. 
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accepting the terms offered by the government as fully satisfying its 
demands; and finally, the party would have to eliminate from its 
program alI articles incompatible with the agreement and would have 
to restrict all future activity to the carrying out of its terms.60 These 
conditions suggest that Tisza did not grasp the depth of the commit- 
ment of Maniu and his colleagues to the idea of self-determination. 
His main goal was clearly to neutralize the National Party as an 
independent political force and, by depriving the Rumanians of its 
leadership, to prepare the way for their integration into Hungarian 
society. 
Not surprisingly, exchanges of views between Tisza and the Ruma- 
nians during the next few months were unproductive. Maniu declared 
the conditions Tisza had set forth totally ~naccep t ab l e ,~~  while Tisza 
persisted in thinking that the Rumanians could in the end be brought 
around by his offer of electoral districts.62 
In the fall of 1913 new elements had entered the peace process as 
the Rumanian question in Hungary assumed growing importance in 
international relations. Primarily from Vienna and Bucharest strong 
pressure was brought to bear on Tisza and the Rumanian National 
Party to settle their differences in the interest of regional peace and 
stability. On the Austrian side, Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his 
associates, especially the Austro-Hungarian minister to Rumania, 
Count Ottakar Czernin, used all their influence to preserve Rumania's 
links with the Monarchy and the Triple Alliance. Both men were 
convinced that one of the main obstacles to good relations between 
the two countries was the abiding discontent of the Rumanian minor- 
ity in Hungary. 
Czernin, who attributed his appointment as minister to the "initia- 
tive" of Franz Ferdinand, served the cause of a rapprochement be- 
tween the Rumanians and the Hungarian government with great skill 
and devotion.63 Upon his arrival in Bucharest he was shocked to 
discover the extent of the hostility of public opinion toward the Dual 
Monarchy. The effect of widespread public indignation at the alleged 
mistreatment of the Rumanians of Hungary on Rumanian government 
policy had, in his view, been nothing short of disastrous for Austria; 
even King Carol, who had remained firm in his attachment to the 
alliance with the Central Powers, and a number of leading pro- 
60 BARSR, Bucharest. Arhiva Valeriu Brani~te, 111, 2 a-c: Brani~te's summary of the 
discussions between the Committee of Three and Tisza. 
61 Ibid. Fondul corespondenfa: Iuliu Maniu to Teodor Mihali, November 26, 1913. 
6 2  REKL: Tisza to Count Leopold Berchtold, January 15, 1914, no. 1. 
63  Ottakar Czernin, Im Weltkriege (Berlin and Vienna, 1919), pp. 101-147. 
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German politicians, could no longer afford openly to pursue a policy 
of friendship with Austria. To defuse this hostility and suspicion and 
to restore friendly relations between the Monarchy and Rumania he 
urged that no effort be spared to placate the Rumanians of Hungary. 
The matter was urgent. He feared that delay would merely encourage 
the expansion of an irredentist movement on both sides of the Car- 
pathians that would make any discussion of a rapprochement aca-
demic. As matters stood, he reported in December 1913, the alliance 
between Rumania and Austria-Hungary "was not worth the paper it 
was written on," and in the event of a crisis the Monarchy could not 
count upon the military support of R ~ m a n i a . ~ ~  
Czernin kept Franz Ferdinand regularly informed of the situation in 
Bucharest and pleaded for his personal intervention both in Vienna to 
counteract opposition to a Magyar-Rumanian agreement and in 
Bucharest, where he enjoyed some popularity, to persuade the gov- 
ernment to discourage intransigence on the part of the National 
Party.6S Franz Ferdinand's efforts may have had some effect in 
Bucharest, since an agreement between Tisza and the National Party 
fitted in with the foreign policy objectives of both the King and (for the 
moment) the Liberal opposition. The Archduke even seems to have 
influenced policy in Budapest where he persuaded Tisza (through 
Berchtold) to increase the number of electoral districts to be assigned 
the Rumanians from twenty-four to twenty-seven.66 
Franz Ferdinand also tried to soften the intransigence of Rumanian 
leaders in Hungary. He kept himself informed of their negotiating 
position through Aurel C. Popovici, who transmitted copies of docu- 
ments from the Committee of Ten to the Archduke's ~hancellery.~' 
Through Brani~te he repeatedly impressed upon Rumanian negotia- 
tors the necessity of an early and comprehensive agreement with the 
Hungarian government .68 
The efforts of outsiders, however, had little effect on the course of 
events, and by the end of January 1914 the executive committee of 
the National Party had decided to reject Tisza's latest proposals. 
Braniqte's motion to accept them as the basis of a preliminary under- 
64 Osterreich-~ngarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise 1908 his zum Kriegs-
ausbruch 1914, ed. Ludwig Bittner and Hans Uebersberger (9 vols.; Vienna and 
Leipzig, 1930), 7: 611-12, 628. 
65  REKL: Czernin to Tisza, January 13 and 14, 1914. 
66 Ibid.: Tisza to Berchtold, January IS, 1914, no. 1. 
67  BARSR, Bucharest. Fondul corespondenfa: Aurel C. Popovici to Teodor Mihali, 
November 24, 1913; Iuliu Maniu to Teodor Mihali, November 26, 1913. 
68 Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kahinette, 1871-1914, vol. 39 (Berlin, 1926), 
p. 472: Julius von Waldthausen, German minister to Rumania, to Theobald von 
Bethmann-Hollweg, January 1, 1914. 
The Nationality Problem in Hungary 643 
standing was voted down. The majority could not shake off the 
bitterness and distrust caused by decades of arbitrary treatment at the 
hands of the g ~ v e r nmen t . ~ ~  
As a last resort Tisza turned to the Rumanian clergy. Over the 
years he had cultivated friendly relations with Greek Catholic and 
Orthodox prelates and had planned to use their good offices in 1905 to 
overcome the resistance of Rumanian political leaders.70 In February 
1914 in letters to all metropolitans and bishops he declared his will- 
ingness to do everything within his power to further understanding 
between their two peoples, but cautioned that he could make no 
significant changes in the terms he had already offered the National 
Party. In requesting their aid, he urged them publicly to support 
"moderate elements" against the continued obstruction of "radi-
c a l ~ . ' ' ~ ~  
The prelates replied in general terms that they welcomed any at- 
tempt to restore good feelings between Magyars and Rumanians, but 
they took no position independent of the National Party. In the course 
of the negotiations party leaders had kept them fully informed and had 
sought their approval for demands relating to church and school 
affairs.72 Such cooperation was natural because the clergy had serious 
grievances of its own against the government, which it had not hesi- 
tated to express on numerous occasions, often in blunt terms.73 Tis- 
za's appeal to the clergy to challenge the National Party for leadership 
thus had no chance of success. Gone were the days when the Greek 
Catholic and Orthodox bishops had served as national political lead- 
ers. When in the summer of 1913 Orthodox Metropolitan Ioan 
MeJianu had tried to organize a general conference of church and lay 
leaders to discuss Magyar-Rumanian relations, he was reminded by 
Teodor Mihali that the National Party alone represented the nation in 
its dealings with the g ~ v e r nm e n t . ~ ~  The conference did not take place. 
In the middle of February the negotiations between Tisza and the 
National Party came to an end. In a letter to Mihali on the 12th Tisza 
69 REKL: Miron Cristea to Tisza, January 26, 1914; Czernin to Tisza, January 26, 
1914. 
70 Ibid.: Orthodox Metropolitan Ioan Mefianu to Tisza, January 18, 1905; Greek 
Catholic Bishop Ioan Szabo to Tisza, January 19, 1905; Orthodox Bishop Ioan Papp to 
Tisza, January 26, 1905. 
Istvan Tisza, 0sszes munkai, vol. 2 (Budapest, 1924), pp. 156-158: Tisza to the 
clergy, February 6 ,  1914. 
72  BARSR, Bucharest. Fondul corespondenfa: Iuliu Maniu to Valeriu Brani~te,  Sep- 
tember 12, 1913. 
7 3  REKL: Miron Cristea to Prime Minister Laszlo Lukacs, April 1913; Metropolitan 
Ioan Mefianu to Tisza, January 31, 1914. 
74 BARSR, Bucharest. Fondul corespondenfa: Teodor Mihali to Valeriu Brani~te,  
August 6, 1913. 
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expressed the hope that he and his colleagues would not react to the 
"temporary failure" of their efforts in such a way as to prevent a 
permanent accord.75 On the 18th the executive committee of the 
National Party, citing Tisza's failure to provide firm guarantees of 
their "ethnic individuality," announced its rejection of his propos- 
a l ~ . ~ ~  
The task of explaining the committee's decision fell to Maniu, its 
leader. As he saw it, the immediate cause of the collapse of the 
negotiations had been Tisza's insistence upon maintaining the Magyar 
national character of the Hungarian state. In the final analysis, ac- 
cording to Maniu, he had failed to harmonize the legitimate interests 
of a unitary state with the equally legitimate strivings of diverse ethnic 
groups to preserve their character and further their political, eco-
nomic, and cultural development. His refusal to admit that Hungary 
was a multinational state and his recognition of the Magyars as the 
sole creators and sustainers of the state, who could not be "de-
graded" to the level of the other nationalities, had emptied his con- 
cessions of any real substance. In a state where the constitution 
placed one people above all the others there could be no genuine 
equality of nationalities; there could be only concessions to individual 
citizens and groups, such as language rights, in exceptional circum- 
stances and at the pleasure of the government in power. Conse-
quently, throughout the negotiations Tisza had made no attempt to 
alter the existing constitutional structure and provide the political and 
judicial institutions necessary to guarantee the rights of the minorities 
in perpetuity. Under these circumstances, Maniu concluded, the Na- 
tional Party could not accept Tisza's offer, could not change its 
program, and could not acquiesce in the passive role he had reserved 
for it.77 
Iv 
The outbreak of the First World War and subsequent events on the 
diplomatic and battle fronts in the fall of 1914 did not change the 
direction of Magyar-Rumanian relations. Neither diplomatic pressures 
from Vienna, and now Berlin, on Tisza, nor persuasion from 
Budapest and Bucharest directed at the Rumanian National Party 
could resolve the central issues in dispute. 
75 REKL: Tisza to Teodor Mihali, February 12, 1914. 
76  Roma*nuI, February 6119, 1914. 
77 Ibid., March 7120, 1914. Maniu published a similar critique in Pester Lloyd of 
Budapest on March 18, 1914. It is reproduced in Stoica, Iuliu Maniu, pp. 72-84. 
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The main concern of Austrian and German diplomats was not the 
welfare of the Magyar national state, let alone equality of rights for 
the Rumanians. Rather, with mounting desperation, they bent their 
efforts toward persuading the Rumanian government to join the Cen- 
tral Powers or at least maintain a benevolent neutrality. Czernin in 
Bucharest continued to serve as the chief mediator between Vienna, 
Bucharest, and Budapest. Conversations with the king and various 
politicians had convinced him that the position of the Dual Monarchy 
in Rumania had become so critical that, to avert a "catastrophe," 
Tisza must be persuaded to make immediate far-reaching concessions 
to the Rumanian minority in Hungary. 
Czernin had the support of Prime Minister Ion I. C. BrBtianu, who, 
though he was pro-French and harbored long-range plans for the 
acquisition of the Austro-Hungarian provinces of Transylvania and 
Bukovina, had no intention of alienating Austria until her collapse had 
become a certainty. In the interest of "normal relations," therefore, 
he proposed that Tisza grant further concessions to the Rumanian 
minority and that he publicly acknowledge their patriotic response to 
the call to arms and promise that their loyalty would be suitably 
r e ~ a r d e d . ' ~He persuaded Czernin that the key to the success of such 
an initiative would be the approval of Rumanian leaders in Hungary. 
Czernin agreed and pleaded with Tisza to do whatever was necessary 
to elicit such a declaration of support. Of crucial importance, in his 
view, would be a statement from Maniu that the Rumanians of Hun- 
gary were satisfied with what they had obtained from the government 
and looked forward to their future development in Hungary with 
complete c ~ n f i d e n c e . ~ ~  
The role of the Rumanian government did not stop with Brgtianu's 
suggestions for a Magyar-Rumanian accord. Fully aware of the impor- 
tance of Rumania to the war effort of the Central Powers and playing 
upon fears of a Rumanian tilt toward France and Russia, Brgtianu 
(and King Carol and various Liberal and Conservative politicians) 
sought to enhance their influence over events and to acquire territory 
at no sacrifice to themselves. They came up with such imaginative 
proposals as a "political statute" or, in plainer for T r an sy l~an i a ,~~  
terms, autonomy for the Rumanian minority; a "readjustment" of the 
border with Bukovina, justified as a way of blunting the effect on 
public opinion of an offer by Russia of Austro-Hungarian territory; 
REKL: Czernin to Tisza, August 26, 1914. 
79  Ibid.: Czernin to Tisza, September 25 and 26, 1914; Czernin to Berchtold, October 
2 and 21, 1914. 
Tisza, Osszes munka'i, 2: 125: Czernin to the Foreign Ministry, September 7, 1914. 
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and an occupation of Transylvania by the Rumanian army on the 
pretext of defending the province from a Russian attack.81 Although 
Austro-Hungarian officials gave them short shrift, Rumanian claims 
against Hungarian sovereignty had a chilling effect on Magyar-
Rumanian relations. 
Tisza responded to the intense diplomatic pressure by improving 
slightly the terms he had offered the National Party in January. He 
also saw the wisdom of eliciting public declarations of support from 
leading Rumanians of Hungary. Although he agreed with Czernin that 
such statements might curtail anti-Austrian "agitation" in Bucharest, 
his main purpose was to prepare both Rumanian and Magyar public 
opinion in Hungary for a final attempt to settle the nationality prob- 
lem. He reasoned that patriotic declarations from leading Rumanians 
would not only mobilize broad Rumanian support for his program, but 
would also persuade the Magyars that the Rumanians were loyal citi- 
zens and that concessions would not, therefore, endanger the unity of 
the state.82 But Tisza soon gave up hope of obtaining the endorsement 
of the executive committee of the National Party. He blamed its 
recalcitrance on the "radicals" led by Maniu, whom he accused of 
using the critical military position of the Monarchy to "extort more 
and more" from the Hungarian government. 83 
Tisza turned again to the clergy. He asked Bishop Hosszu to solicit 
declarations of support for Hungary's war effort from the Greek 
Catholic clergy, a task Hosszu readily accepted because, as he put it, 
the victory of the "Muscovites" would mean death for his church and 
the Rumanian nation.84 Tisza also wooed the Orthodox clergy. His 
letter to Metropolitan MeJianu on September 22 formed the center- 
piece of a final effort to placate the National Party. He had warm 
praise for the loyalty and "incomparable" bravery of the Rumanians 
and declared his readiness to institute fundamental improvements in 
the status of the Rumanians, including the amendment of the electoral 
law to give them more equitable representation in parliament and 
changes in the administration and funding of church schools. MeJianu 
replied that he welcomed the government's decision to satisfy the 
"just desires" of the Rumanian people and promised to do his utmost 
81 Miklos Komjathy, ed., Protokolle des Gemeinsamen Ministerrates der bster-
reichisch-Vngarischen Monarchie (1914-1918) (Budapest, 1966), p. 179: Session of the 
Ministerrat for September 20, 1914. 
82 REKL: Tisza to Bishop Vasile Hosszu, August 26, 1914. 
83 Ibid.: Tisza to Czernin, September 22, 1914; Tisza, bsszes munkai, vol. 2, pp. 
244-5: Tisza to the Foreign Ministry, October 22, 1914. 
84 REKL: Vasile Hosszu to Tisza, August 30, 1914; Tisza to Hosszu, September 2, 
1914. 
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to foster harmony between their two peoples. This was a fairly rou- 
tine statement, but it was the kind of exchange Tisza thought would 
be useful.85 He wrote at once to other prelates and prominent laymen, 
urging them to arrange a favorable reception for his proposals in their 
respective localities. The same message went out to the prefects of all 
the counties of Transylvania and Hungary with a large Rumanian 
population instructing them to use their powers to the fullest to gain 
the support of leading Rumanians and, no less important, to guide 
Magyar public opinion in the "proper direction." Tisza was clearly 
worried about the effect the contemplated liberalization of the fran- 
chise would have on Magyar sensitivities, since it would all too 
visibly enhance the political power of the Rumanians in many dis- 
t r i c t ~ . ~ ~  
Despite professions of confidence in the loyalty of the Rumanians, 
Tisza realized how volatile the public temper could become under 
wartime conditions. In the first months of the war he judged the 
behavior of Rumanian civilians "praiseworthy" and had no fault to 
find with Rumanian troops at the front.87 This assessment was, on the 
whole, correct. The Rumanians had fulfilled their civic responsibilities 
in keeping with their traditional patriotism and attachment to the 
dynasty. Even Maniu considered the actions of his people "natural," 
and dismissed Tisza's call for formal declarations of loyalty as super- 
fluous because the Rumanians had already expressed their sentiments 
by deeds.88 Nonetheless, Tisza found the mood of certain elements of 
the population, notably the parish clergy and seminaries, unsettling, a 
presentiment confirmed by Bishop Hosszu, who warned that he could 
not vouch for their actions in the event of a Rumanian attack on the 
Monarchy. Tisza thought that a Rumanian military occupation of any 
part of Transylvania would have "incalculable" effects on the local 
Rumanian population and might, if it lasted more than a few months, 
render the situation "un~ontrollable."~~ 
Such thoughts reinforced Tisza's determination not to weaken the 
authority of the government over the Rumanians. As at the beginning 
of his negotiations in 1910 with Mihu so now national autonomy was, 
Ibid.: Tisza to Metropolitan Mefianu, September 22, 1914; Tisza to Czernin, 
September 24, 1914. 
86 Ibid.: Tisza to Czernin, September 24, 1914; Tisza to the fbispans, September 25, 
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87 Ibid.: Tisza to Vasile Hosszu, August 26, 1914; Tisza to Czernin, September 22, 
1914. 
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for him, a dead issue. He rejected outright any suggestion that he add 
a Rumanian as mininster without portfolio to the cabinet and that he 
appoint Rumanians as prefects in counties of predominantly Ruman- 
ian populations. He became thoroughly irritated with Czernin for 
discussing with officials in Bucharest the establishment of a separate 
administration for Transylvania. He minced no words in expressing 
displeasure with the notion that Transylvania was an area peculiarly 
suited to the realization of Rumanian autonomy as advocated by 
Maniu and his supporters. While admitting that there was indeed a 
Rumanian question in Hungary, he denied that it could be a Transyl- 
vanian question because 40 percent of the population of Transylvania 
was composed of Magyars and Germans, who in "cultural attain-
ments" "far outweighed" the Rumanians, and because almost one- 
half of the Rumanians of Hungary lived outside T r a n s y l ~ an i a . ~~  
In contrast to Czernin and German officials, who worked desper- 
ately to placate the Rumanian government, Tisza exhibited a studied 
coolness toward Rumania. In the first place, he regarded the status of 
the Rumanians of Hungary as a domestic matter, which he intended 
to regulate in accordance with the best interests of the Hungarian 
state and which, therefore, could never become the object of interna- 
tional barter.g1 Secondly, he was convinced that concessions to 
Rumania (or to the Rumanian minority in Hungary) would have no 
significant effect on her behavior because she would act in accordance 
with her own best interests, which, in the final analysis, would be 
determined by events on the battlefield. Tisza branded the idea that 
Rumania be allowed to occupy Transylvania in order to block a 
Russian invasion an utter absurdity, merely a trick by which Rumania 
hoped to increase her territory without shedding any blood. He con- 
cluded that the more inducements the Monarchy offered Rumania to 
join the Central Powers the more she would ask, taking concessions 
as a sign of weakness. Certain that the Rumanian government feared a 
serious war, he recommended to Berchtold that the Monarchy openly 
declare its intention to fight for Transylvania and Bukovina and to call 
upon Bulgaria and Turkey for a s s i ~ t a n c e . ~ ~  
In early November Tisza published his correspondence with Met- 
ropolitan Mefianu in newspapers throughout the country. Publication 
90 REKL: Tisza to Czernin, September 24 and October 10, 1914; Tisza, 0sszes  
munkdi, vol. 2, pp. 134-135, 232-3, 239: Tisza to Czernin, September 13 and October 
17 and 20, 1914; Komjathy, Protokolle, p. 181. 
91 REKL: Tisza to Berchtold, January 15, 1914, no. 2 and November 1, 1914; Tisza 
to Czernin, October 7, 1914. 
92 REKL: Tisza to Berchtold, September 11, 1914; Tisza, 0sszes  munkrii, vol. 2, p. 
126: Tisza to Czernin, September 7, 1914; Komjathy, Protokolle, pp. 180, 181, 183. 
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was accompanied by a proclamation from Emperor Francis Joseph of 
amnesty for Rumanians convicted of political crimes in Hungary and 
by an order of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior permitting the 
display of the Transylvanian Rumanian tricolor alongside the Hunga- 
rian national colors. Tisza regarded his present initiative as the culmi- 
nation of all his efforts since entering public life to bring about a 
reconciliation between Magyars and Rumanians and as the final step 
in the series of negotiations that had begun in 1910.y3 Although 
"heartened" by the "restraint" of Magyar public opinion and by 
expressions of support from Rumanian prelates and a few prominent 
laymen, he soon recognized that his latest proposals had fallen on 
barren ground. Those Rumanians whose opinions really counted had 
maintained their reserve. 
A few days after the publication of the Tisza-Mefianu correspon- 
dence, Iuliu Maniu set forth the position of the National Party on the 
front page of Roma'nul. He yielded nothing to Tisza in firmness and 
consistency. Although he found reason to hope for an improvement in 
relations between the Rumanians and the government in the latter's 
recognition of its obligation to satisfy the needs of all its citizens, he 
could not cite a single area of public life in which any tangible 
improvement in the status of the nationalities had occurred. How, he 
asked, could anyone seriously contemplate an agreement between the 
government and the Rumanians without institutional guarantees of a 
continuous Rumanian influence on legislation and administration, 
without the appointment of Rumanians to public office in proportion 
to their numbers, without full respect for the Rumanian language in 
public administration and the courts, and without instruction in 
Rumanian in educational institutions of all levels? He restated his 
faith in national autonomy as the "most efficient way" of handling 
these matters, but he could find no trace of such an idea in Tisza's 
letter to Mefianu. He concluded that Tisza's latest proposals offered 
no greater possibility than his earlier initiatives of settling the differ- 
ences that separated their two peoples.y4 
Tisza stuck to his final offer. He refused to jeopardize the Magyar 
national state by fostering self-determination among the minorities, 
and he rejected the entreaties of German leaders in the fall of 1914 
that no price was too high to pay to gain the military cooperation of 
Rumania and thus ensure final victory.y5 
93 REKL: Tisza to Berchtold, November 1, 1914. 
94 Roma*nul, November 1/14, 1914. 
95 REKL: Tisza's notes on his conversations with German leaders in Berlin, Novem- 
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Direct contacts between Tisza (he left office in May 1917) and his 
successors and the Rumanian National Party were not resumed until 
November 1918, by which time historical Hungary was already disin- 
tegrating into a number of national territories. The Rumanian nation- 
ality problem was settled a few weeks later on December 1, 1918 
when a National Assembly numbering some 100,000 Rumanians from 
all parts of Transylvania and Hungary met at Alba Iulia (Gyulafeher- 
var) to proclaim the union of Transylvania with the Kingdom of 
Rumania. 
v 
The negotiations between Tisza and the Rumanian National Party 
were symptomatic of the impasse that had arisen between the "mas- 
ter nations" and the minorities of Austria-Hungary after 1890. In both 
halves of the Dual Monarchy, whether in Cisleithania in the Austro- 
Italian or Austro-Czech relationship, or in Transleithania in the 
Magyar-Croat or Magyar-Rumanian relationship, a similar irrecon- 
cilability is discernible between the efforts of one side to enhance the 
powers of the central authority and those of the other to stretch that 
authority to the limit in the interest of national self-determination. 
The issue between Tisza and the Rumanians, at one level, was 
clearly centralism versus federalism. Had the dispute remained 
strictly constitutional, a workable solution might have been found. 
Maniu and his colleagues were, after all, not revolutionaries who 
sought to overthrow the existing political and social order in Hungary. 
Rather, as their dealings with Tisza showed, they stood for gradual 
change through the extension of democratic political and economic 
institutions. Nor can they be described as irredentists. As long as the 
hope of a federalization of the Monarchy existed, Maniu and company 
were prepared to accept a solution to national aspirations within 
existing frontiers. Tisza himself was not averse to compromise; he 
went farther than any of his predecessors in putting together a combi- 
nation of concessions that might weave the Rumanians (and, later, the 
other minorities) into the general fabric of Hungarian society. 
In the final analysis, the negotiations between Tisza and Rumanian 
leaders failed because both parties had become convinced that theirs 
was no ordinary political give-and-take or constitutional touching-up, 
but that national survival itself was at stake. For Tisza, the supreme 
goal was to complete the process of Magyar nation-state building; for 
the Rumanians, it was to ensure the free expression of the national 
genius. At this level compromise became unthinkable. Neither side 
could subordinate its "being" to the other, still less to the "simpler" 
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concerns of Vienna or Bucharest. Consequently, as Tisza and the 
Rumanians pursued the ideal of the national state, the middle ground 
between assimilation of the minorities and dissolution of historical 
Hungary disappeared. 
